INTRODUCTION 69
The 196 Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) are currently setting ambitious post-70 2020 biodiversity targets (Mace et al., 2018; Visconti et al., 2019) . Yet, despite widespread 71 recognition of the need to slow and ultimately halt biodiversity loss, transformation of the natural 72 world for infrastructure, industry, commercial agriculture, urbanisation and resource extraction 73 (hereafter, 'development') continues to drive declines (IPBES, 2019) . Ceasing all such transformation 74 is not feasible in the face of desirable development imperatives (Griggs et al., 2013; United Nations, 75 2018) . Governments, developers and civil society therefore need tools for reconciling development 76 and conservation to reduce the rate of biodiversity loss. 77
The mitigation hierarchy is an approach for responding to biodiversity losses arising from 78 development. It has been embedded into numerous government, lender and corporate policies 79 (BBOP, 2012; Gardner et al., 2013; IFC, 2012; IUCN, 2018a; Rainey et al., 2014) . Proponents of 80 development projects-where these are mandated by policy ('regulated sectors')-are required to 81 reduce adverse biodiversity outcomes through sequentially following four steps. Only after 82 completing avoidance, and then restoration/rehabilitation of disturbed areas onsite, should the 83 fourth step be taken -compensating for any residual losses through biodiversity offsetting. When 84 applied as the final step of the mitigation hierarchy, biodiversity offsets are typically intended to 85 achieve an outcome in which there is (at least) 'no net loss' of the impacted biodiversity due to a 86 particular project (BBOP, 2012; Bull, Gordon, Watson, & Maron, 2016; IUCN, 2016) . 87
Biodiversity offsetting, however, is almost never designed to align with the achievement of national 88 or sub-national ('jurisdictional') biodiversity targets that aim to halt species and ecosystem decline, 89 or achieve biodiversity recovery. In large part, this is because no net loss of biodiversity at the level 90 of individual development projects can mean something quite different to no net loss at the 91 jurisdictional level (Maron, Brownlie, et al., 2018) . When framed in relation to a jurisdictional 92 biodiversity target, no net loss implies that the amount of a particular biodiversity feature (e.g. 93 forest) should not fall below what we have now; in other words, it means no net loss relative to a 94 'fixed reference scenario' (Maron, Brownlie, et al., 2018) . Under such a scenario, any lost forest (for 95 example) would need to be replaced to achieve absolute no net loss -that is, to maintain the 96 amount of forest at its current level (Figure 1) . 97 This is rarely the intended meaning of no net loss in offset policies which guide compensation for 98 residual losses at the development project level, not the jurisdictional level. Project-level no net loss 99 is often framed relative to a counterfactual scenario of decline, in which biodiversity is expected to 100 be lost even without the development (and its offset) (Maron, Bull, Evans, & Gordon, 2015; IUCN, 101 2016) . The rationale is that the protection provided by the offset action achieves a benefit by 102 averting a loss or decline that would otherwise have occurred. Such 'averted loss' offsetting (also 103 called avoided loss or protection offsetting) is one of the two main forms of biodiversity offsetting 104 (the other being restoration). It is referenced as a key approach to offsetting in policies and 105 standards espoused by financial institutions (IFC, 2012; World Bank Group, 2016) , multistakeholder 106 platforms (BBOP, 2012; IUCN, 2016) and jurisdictions (Australia, Columbia and Chile (Maron, 107 Brownlie et al., 2018) ). In a global review of over 12,000 individual offsets projects, Bull and Strange 108 (2018) found that approximately 66% used averted loss offsetting, either exclusively, or in 109 combination with other measures. 110
When framed this way, even best-practice offsets result in less biodiversity over time, as protection 111 of already-existing biodiversity, which is expected to decline in the future, can be exchanged for 112 biodiversity losses at the development site(s) (Bekessy et al., 2010; Buschke, Brownlie, & Manuel, 113 2017; Maron, Brownlie, et al., 2018; Moilanen & Laitila, 2016) . Across multiple projects, offsetting 114 that achieves no net loss relative to a counterfactual scenario of biodiversity decline maintains the 115 declining trend, and corresponds with a net loss at the jurisdictional level ( Figure 1) (Gibbons & 116 Lindenmayer, 2007; Quétier, van Teeffelen, Pilgrim, von Hase, & ten Kate, 2015) . 117 <Figure 1> 119 120 Relative no net loss of biodiversity at the project level does not equate with the achievement of 121 absolute no net loss at the jurisdictional level. This mismatch causes conceptual confusion and 122 ambiguity about the meaning and intention of no net loss as a policy objective. It also makes it hard 123 to assess the contribution that project-level compensatory actions (e.g. biodiversity offsetting) are 124 making to broader conservation goals, such as the achievement of jurisdictional biodiversity targets 125 (Maron, Brownlie, et al., 2018) . We are aware of only one national policy that links compensatory 126 actions to the achievement of a target (limiting ecosystem loss to pre-defined thresholds) -South 127
Africa's Draft National Biodiversity Offset Policy (Republic of South Africa, 2017). If offsetting 128 continues to occur in isolation from broader conservation imperatives, the risk is that at best, 129 offsetting will contribute minimally to conservation objectives, and at worst, will detract from 130 achieving such goals (e.g. where counterfactual-based approaches entrench ongoing declines 131 (Maron, Brownlie et al., 2018) ). An overarching framework is therefore needed to align project-level 132 actions under the mitigation hierarchy, particularly of ecological compensation for residual losses, 133 with the biodiversity targets that a jurisdiction may strive to achieve. 134
Here, we propose such a framework, and review its suitability in applied conservation policy. We 135 refer throughout to 'ecological compensation' to distinguish our proposed approach as an 136 alternative to the narrower concept of biodiversity offsetting, which has strict rules about like-for-137 like trades in biodiversity and aims to achieve at least no net loss relative to a counterfactual 138 scenario (BBOP, 2012; Bull et al., 2016; IUCN, 2016) . We discuss the consequences of different 139 approaches to ecological compensation, and provide guidance on how, where and when the 140 framework we present could be operationalised. This framework entails several advantages over 141 current practice. First, it makes explicit the contribution of ecological compensation towards 142 meeting jurisdictional biodiversity targets. Second, it avoids the need for complex (and highly 143 uncertain) calculations of the counterfactual scenario. Third, it strengthens the focus on avoidance, 144 because it explicitly identifies instances where biodiversity losses require proportionate increases 145 through actions like restoration, which will not always be a feasible option. Fourth, it provides 146 conceptual clarity; the net outcome across impact and compensation sites for a particular project 147 would align with the desired net outcome at the jurisdictional level. 148
Jurisdictional-level biodiversity targets 149
The framework we propose is general, and can apply to any biodiversity targets that describe a 150 desired state of biodiversity ('outcome-based targets') at any jurisdictional scale. Target-setting is 151 not a part of the framework, but the existence of quantifiable targets is a pre-requisite for its 152 implementation. Indeed, the targets that we refer to in this framework should be set independently 153 of, and have primacy over, policy relating to the mitigation hierarchy and compensation. This is to 154 prevent targets being designed to facilitate a particular policy approach. 155 Biodiversity targets are a familiar concept. Under the CBD Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2010-2020 156 (UN CBD, 2010), more than 160 Parties to the CBD already have targets for biodiversity conservation 157 laid out in their National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plans (a response to the 20 global Aichi 158 Targets agreed in 2010) (UNEP, 2019) . However, these are often not outcomes-based targets (IUCN, 159 2018b) -a reflection of the fact that the Aichi Targets themselves are predominantly non-160 quantifiable, and lack focus on desired outcomes (Barnes, Glew, Wyborn, & Craigie, 2018; Butchart, 161 Di Marco, & Watson, 2016) . 162
As Parties to the CBD negotiate the post-2020 global biodiversity framework, there are increasing 163 calls for clear, quantifiable science-based targets for the retention and recovery of biodiversity and 164 nature (Dinerstein et al., 2019; Mace et al., 2018; Maron, Simmonds, & Watson, 2018; Visconti et al., 165 2019; Watson & Venter, 2017) . Such targets should be incorporated in national plans and actions, 166 and linked to the achievement of broader global goals (IUCN, 2018b; Mace et al., 2018) . Plentiful 167 guidance on target-setting is available (Butchart et al., 2016; Carwardine, Klein, Wilson, Pressey, & 168 Possingham, 2009; Di Marco, Watson, Venter, & Possingham, 2016; Doherty et al., 2018; Maron, 169 Simmonds, et al., 2018; Maxwell et al., 2015; Watson & Venter, 2017) . The framework we present 170 requires that targets are measurable, and explicitly reflect the desired state (outcome) of the 171 biodiversity feature (e.g. species population, ecosystem extent) on which the target focusses, rather 172 than a desired rate of change, or a mechanism for achieving the target. Examples of such targets 173 that already exist include the French Government's pledge to support and maintain a population of 174 500 wolves for the years 2018 to 2023 (Republique Francaise, 2018) , and ecosystem-specific 175 retention thresholds that are incorporated into South Africa's Draft National Offset Policy (Brownlie 176 et al., 2017 (see Supporting Information 1)). 177
RESULTS 178

Aligning ecological compensation with biodiversity targets 179
In this framework, targeted conservation outcomes such as desired species populations or minimum 180 ecosystem extents are set in absolute terms at the jurisdictional level. The required trajectory 181 needed to achieve a target for a particular species, assemblage or ecosystem (hereafter, 182 'biodiversity feature') depends on the level (e.g. number, amount, area) of the biodiversity feature 183 when the jurisdictional-level target for that biodiversity feature was set ( Figure 2 ). 184 185 <Figure 2> 186 187 When a biodiversity feature is approximately at the target level ongoing 'No Net Loss' is required. All 188 losses of the biodiversity feature need to be balanced by proportionate gains in order to maintain 189 the biodiversity feature at the target level. It follows that when a biodiversity feature is below the 190 target level, 'Net Gain' is needed to achieve the target, whereby the biodiversity feature increases in 191 absolute terms to (at least) the point where the target is met. 'Managed Net Loss' may be 192 appropriate in exceptional circumstances when a biodiversity feature is above its target. Setting a 193 target below current levels might require that: (1) the particular biodiversity feature is very common 194 and widespread; (2) some losses at the jurisdictional level can occur without compromising the 195 ecological integrity and function of the feature (e.g. population viability, intactness); and (3) 196 continued, strictly managed drawdown to a pre-determined target level is socially acceptable. 197
Once a jurisdiction has established targets, and thus specified the required trajectory for its 198 biodiversity features, project-level actions under the mitigation hierarchy can be designed to 199 contribute to achieving these targets. The approach to compensating for residual losses at the 200 project level depends upon several factors. The type of compensatory action depends on whether 201 achievement of the jurisdictional biodiversity target requires Net Gain, No Net Loss, or occasionally 202 in specific situations allows for Managed Net Loss. The amount of compensation required for any 203 given project is guided by the amount of residual loss, how much of the affected biodiversity feature 204 remains relative to its particular target, and policy decisions regarding the share of responsibility 205 among sectors. Below, we set out each consideration. 206
Achieving jurisdictional outcomes -Improvement, Maintenance and Avoidance 207
There are two broad types of ecological compensation in this framework: Maintenance and 208 Improvement. By 'Maintenance' we mean preventing a threat to ensure persistence of a biodiversity 209 feature at its current condition, extent or population (and conservation status), for example by 210 legally securing existing biodiversity at a compensation site. The aim of Maintenance is to prevent 211 existing biodiversity from being lost at a site in the future (i.e. avert future losses). The net result of 212
Maintenance interventions across a jurisdiction is a reduction in the biodiversity feature, because 213 the loss from development is compensated for by securing the persistence of the biodiversity 214 feature at another site(s), where it already exists. 215
This contrasts with 'Improvement', which involves producing a quantifiable increase in the 216 biodiversity feature. Improvement can take a range of forms, and result from a variety of 217 interventions such as habitat enhancement (e.g. improving condition of native vegetation) or 218 removal of pervasive pressures to allow populations to increase (e.g. invasive species control). In 219 reality, the interventions that achieve Maintenance and Improvement at a site can overlap-legally 220 securing a site and managing it at a moderate intensity might preserve that site's condition 221 (Maintenance), but if management intensity is increased it might achieve Improvement; similarly, 222 legal protection of a degraded site might over time allow its recovery (Improvement). Generally, 223 Improvement will require complementary Maintenance as a necessary prerequisite (e.g. securing a 224 site containing the focal biodiversity feature or its habitat, with a view to improving it). 225
Enhancing biodiversity, including via Improvement compensation actions, is ultimately essential for 226 achieving jurisdictional-level No Net Loss or Net Gain-only by increasing the extent and/or 227 condition or amount of a biodiversity feature can No Net Loss (or Net Gain) be achieved under this 228 framework ( Figure 3a and 3b). When carefully linked to biodiversity targets, Maintenance can be 229 used to contribute to Managed Net Loss, until such time that the target is reached, after which 230 Improvement becomes an essential response to any permitted losses ( Figure 3c ). Further, while 231 Maintenance alone cannot achieve No Net Loss or Net Gain at the jurisdictional level, it may be a 232 necessary transitional intervention to ultimately achieving these outcomes in the common situation 233 where a biodiversity feature is (1) below its target; and (2) experiencing rapid and ongoing loss from 234 unregulated pressures, where the mitigation hierarchy is not fully applied. In these circumstances, 235 compensation through Maintenance may be appropriate for a transitional period alongside or in 236 advance of compensation through Improvement (Figure 3d ). However, for such an approach to be a 237 step towards a No Net Loss or Net Gain, transition phases with strict limits must be set (see 238
Supporting Information 1). 239 240 <Figure 3> 241 242 Because this framework explicitly links ecological compensation requirements with jurisdictional-243 level target outcomes, it strengthens the focus on rigorously applying the earlier steps of the 244 mitigation hierarchy. Jurisdictional No Net Loss or Net Gain cannot occur without losses being 245 compensated by Improvement actions such as restoration or increases in species' populations. 246
However, for some biodiversity features, achieving such gains through actions like restoration is 247 either hampered by great uncertainty, or is simply not possible (given, for example, substantial time 248 lags) (Curran, Hellweg, & Beck, 2014; Gibbons et al., 2016; Maron et al., 2012; Moilanen, van 249 Teeffelen, Pilgrim et al., 2013) . This reality limits considerably the types 250 of biodiversity features for which No Net Loss or Net Gain are feasible. Losses of irreplaceable 251 biodiversity features simply cannot be managed though a compensation approach, unless the 252 jurisdictional target involves Managed Net Loss. If an outcome of further (managed net) loss is 253 unacceptable, the only option is more rigorously to apply the earlier steps in the mitigation 254 hierarchy, and avoid losses entirely. 255
The amount of compensation required for a given loss 256
This target-based framework no longer depends upon the complex and often counterintuitive 257 process of defining dynamic counterfactual scenarios to establish what type of action, and how 258 much, is required to compensate for a given loss (as offsetting does). This is because instead of a 259 dynamic counterfactual scenario, a reference point fixed at a particular level-the target-is used. 260
The amount of compensation required for any given project is determined by both how much 261 residual loss a particular biodiversity feature experiences as a result of a development project, and 262 the pathway (e.g. No Net Loss) required to achieve a target, along with several additional 263 considerations (outlined below) that are factored into the calculation of a compensation ratio. The 264 compensation ratios (sometimes called a 'multiplier') detailed here only need to be established 265 once-at the inception of a compensation scheme-and should be applied consistently to all 266 projects. 267
The compensation ratio sets the amount of Improvement or Maintenance required per unit of 268 residual loss to contribute to the achievement of a target, as depicted in Figure 3 . The first step in 269 calculating the compensation ratio is to estimate how much of the affected biodiversity feature ( ) 270 exists relative to its target (at time = 0, when the target, , was set). The current amount of 271 comprises two parts: how much of what exists is already considered effectively protected from 272 adverse impacts (e.g., fully resourced protected areas) or planned to be so protected ( (0)); and 273
how much of what exists could still conceivably be lost (including because of development projects) 274
( (0)). Places identified as being under effective protection ( ) are not available to be used for 275
compensation. 276
Where No Net Loss or Net Gain is needed to achieve a target, the amount of compensation (gain via 277 Improvement) required for a given unit of loss to a particular biodiversity feature is: 278
Where Managed Net Loss is appropriate, the amount of compensation (securing existing biodiversity 282 via Maintenance) required for a given unit of loss to a particular biodiversity feature is: 283
For the transitional approach (Figure 3d ), Equation 2 is used to set Maintenance requirements to 287 ensure that an interim target (threshold) of is not breached, before switching to Improvement 288 using Equation 1 to achieve the desired target. More details on calculating the Improvement and 289
Maintenance compensation ratios (including for transitional approach) are provided in Supporting 290
Information 1 and Supporting Information 2. 291
To exemplify these ratios, compensation for a project-level loss of 100 ha of habitat, consistent with 292
Net Gain linked to a target of doubling the currently-available habitat for a species, requires an 293 Improvement ratio of 2:1. This is based on assumptions that none of the biodiversity feature is 294 currently protected, and all adverse impacts to this biodiversity feature are regulated (i.e. follow the 295 mitigation hierarchy). Here, a ratio 2:1 requires that 200 ha of 'new' equivalent habitat must be 296 successfully created (and maintained) to compensate for the loss. Similarly, Managed Net Loss in 297 which 90% of a remaining ecosystem is to be retained would require a Maintenance ratio of 9:1, 298
wherein nine times the area of residual loss is secured and retained into the future. Again, this 299 assumes no current protection of the ecosystem, and no unregulated losses. If, say, half the 300 remaining ecosystem was already effectively protected, the ratio would be 4:1. 301
These compensation ratios can vary with policy settings. For example, the ratios presented above 302 are based on a proportionate contribution towards the achievement of the target. In other words, a 303 unit of loss caused by a regulated sector requires the same amount of compensation as would a unit 304 of unregulated loss (the liability for which accrues, in effect, to the jurisdictional government) in 305 order to progress toward the target. However, in some instances a jurisdiction may require sectors 306 that are regulated to contribute disproportionately towards a target's achievement. For example, 307 the jurisdiction may require that some sectors make additional contributions towards a biodiversity 308 target, beyond just compensating for their own impacts. Alternatively, the government may 309 shoulder some of the responsibility for compensation to limit the requirements on certain sectors. 310 Government decisions about proportionate or disproportionate responsibility and policy scope 311 (which sectors or type of impact are regulated) can affect both compensation ratios for regulated 312 sectors and the amount of responsibility that falls on governments to address losses that are 313 contrary to the required trajectory needed to achieve target commitments. Therefore, they must be 314 made and factored in at the point of policy development when ratios are calculated (i.e. prior to the 315 policy's implementation) (Supporting Information 2). This allows for transparency and clarity about 316 which actor must do what action, how much of it, and why, to compensate for residual impacts in 317 line with meeting desired targets. 318
Time lags in and uncertainty about achievement of compensatory outcomes are also often dealt 319 with by adjusting ratios. These factors can be incorporated in this approach by increasing the ratios 320 as appropriate Laitila, Moilanen, & Pouzols, 2014; Moilanen & Kotiaho, 321 2018) . This particularly applies to Improvement, where the unadjusted ratio assumes full and certain 322 compensation instantly. The compensation ratio for Improvement thus gives the minimum 323 compensation required for a particular unit of loss (to contribute to achievement of the target), and 324 would need to be increased accordingly to account for time lags and uncertainties (e.g. restoration 325 not being fully successful (Maron et al., 2012; ). 326
Contrast with counterfactual-based offsetting 327
Both target-based ecological compensation, as described in this framework, and counterfactual-328 based offsetting, require strict adherence to the mitigation hierarchy, quantification of residual 329 losses, and determination of compensatory requirements for these losses. The fundamental 330 difference lies in how the compensation required for a particular biodiversity feature is calculated-331 now based on the overall jurisdictional biodiversity target and on policy choices for how to achieve 332 it, rather than a project-specific assessment underpinned by complex counterfactual scenarios. This, 333 and other differences, are summarised in Table 1 . We note that some jurisdictions may lack the 334 enabling environment to (1) develop and implement compensatory policy; and (2) determine and 335 enact either targets for biodiversity conservation, or mechanisms for their achievement. In 336 circumstances such as these, counterfactual-based offsetting may be more appropriate, although 337 this should be considered a temporary solution given its inherent propensity for the uncapped 338 drawdown of biodiversity. As long as appropriate, scientifically-robust biodiversity targets can be set, 339
we propose that a move toward a target-based approach is desirable. A shift to the approach we propose carries risks. First, changing existing regulations, which 358 (currently) promote averted loss offsetting, may result in sub-optimal biodiversity outcomes if the 359 biggest gains (in the short-term) can be made by protecting highly-threatened biodiversity from 360 unmanaged pressures. Our framework deals with this by incorporating a 'phased approach' (see 361 above; Supporting Information 1). Second, having outcomes-based targets places a level of 362 accountability on those who set the target, and those who are required to contribute to its 363 achievement. This may encourage the setting of 'easy' or unambitious targets, which may lead to 364 small compensatory requirements. This underscores the need for science-based targets that are 365 established independently of the design of the compensatory scheme. As long as such targets exist, 366 the simplicity of calculating compensatory requirements and the transparency of the contribution 367 this makes to a specific goal, lends itself to higher certainty for all stakeholders, and more 368 straightforward regulatory monitoring and compliance auditing. 369
Operationalising target-based ecological compensation can draw on lessons from other policy 370 frameworks. For example, REDD+ is a mechanism under the UNFCCC where local forest protection 371 contributes to achieving broader goals (carbon emissions targets). Challenges have been identified 372 regarding multi-level governance, relating to accounting (e.g. carbon crediting, incentives) and 373 implementation (e.g. decision-making) (Cortez et al., 2010; Ravikumar et al., 2015) . This has 374 prompted the development of implementation frameworks (e.g. 'nested' approach proposed by 375 Cortez et al. 2010) , from which a key lesson is that the achievement of national targets is reliant on 376 actors operating at multiple scales, thus necessitating protocols for their engagement, including in 377 decision-making and benefit sharing. In light of the REDD+ experience, coordination among actors, 378 and especially those undertaking projects 'on the ground', to contribute to the achievement of 379 jurisdictional biodiversity targets, will be crucial for successful implementation of target-based 380 ecological compensation. 381
In Brazil, requirements for the protection of a minimum proportion of native vegetation on private 382
properties (legal reserves under the 'Forest Code') aim to help achieve bioregional vegetation 383 retention targets. Brazil's overall approach has the benefit of transparency in desired outcomes, with 384 mechanisms designed explicitly to achieve it (Metzger et al., 2019) . However, criticism of its 385 restrictiveness for business and landholders have led to relaxations of its requirements over time 386 (e.g. amnesty for illegal deforestation on small properties (Soares-Filho et al., 2014)), and even calls 387 for it to be extinguished (Metzger et al. 2019) ). This underscores the risk of implementing any 388 environmental regulation that is reliant on contributions from industry and private individuals to 389 achieve a broader public-good goal (e.g. explicit environmental targets). 390
A target-based ecological compensation approach would be most effective when developed as a 391 coordinated jurisdictional policy, with both jurisdictional net outcomes set and 392 Improvement/Maintenance compensation ratios calculated at the outset. The main enabling 393 conditions (or conversely, barriers to implementation, where these conditions are lacking) for 394 embedding the approach at the jurisdictional level include basic information on the extent/amount 395 and condition of the biodiversity features that would be the focus of the policy, including how much 396 is considered to be already effectively protected, and regulatory control of at least some sectors that 397 cause biodiversity loss. Taken together, these would allow for the calculation of compensation ratios 398 and identification of valid locations for compensation. Once this (non-trivial) work is done, the 399 project-level process of identifying suitable ecological compensation would be greatly simplified. 400
In addition to government policy, most multilateral finance institutions reference 'no net loss' and 401 even 'net gain' requirements in relation to escalating biodiversity risks. For example, IFC 402 Performance Standard 6 requires no net loss where feasible in natural habitats, while net gain is 403 required for critical habitats (IFC, 2012). The simplified ratio-based protocol that is embedded in the 404 target-based approach could facilitate investment by these institutions, and, represents a desirable 405 objective for those multilateral finance institutions with mandates to engage the public sector on 406 policy reform to facilitate sustainable development. 407
Regardless of whether embedded in government policy or industry/corporate standards, this 408 framework does not imply that proponents of development projects are expected to bear the entire 409 burden of a jurisdiction achieving its particular biodiversity targets, nor that compensation alone be 410 used to achieve targets. Indeed, the share that falls on developers is a policy decision for 411 governments (See Results; Supporting Information 2). Fundamentally, it offers a systematic 412 approach to determining project-level compensation that is consistent with the achievement of 413 jurisdictional biodiversity targets. The more comprehensive the policy's scope-that is, the more 414 sectors that are regulated and required to compensate for losses to biodiversity arising from their 415 activities-the greater the contribution of proponents of development to meeting a jurisdiction's 416 biodiversity targets. 417
However, it will rarely, if ever, be the case that a compensatory policy is broad enough in scope to 418 capture all processes that result in the loss of biodiversity. This means that actors other than 419 proponents of development projects (e.g. governments) will need to address losses to biodiversity 420 that are beyond the scope of compensatory policy-the unregulated losses-in combination with a 421 wide suite of other complementary conservation actions that are implemented to contribute to 422 meeting targets. This ecological compensation framework involves setting out clearly the 423 expectation for both proponents of development and jurisdictional authorities as this relates to how 424 to address losses of biodiversity, whereby compensatory actions alongside other conservation 425 investment can contribute to achieving biodiversity targets. 426
Ecological compensation should always be an option of last resort. In instances where the 427 biodiversity features that are exposed to residual project losses are imperilled and irreplaceable-in 428 other words, they cannot be feasibly improved or recreated-ecological compensation is not 429 acceptable, and losses must be avoided altogether. Where residual losses can be reasonably 430 addressed through compensatory interventions, this target-based framework provides a pathway 431 towards more transparent and effective outcomes. It explicitly links compensatory actions to 432 broader biodiversity targets, and clarifies and simplifies the expectations on and requirements of 433 developers. In this regard, it represents a step towards the coordinated planning and integrated 434 actions that will be crucial to stem and reverse biodiversity losses in the face of ongoing Gibbons, P., Evans, M. C., Maron, M., Gordon, A., Le Roux, D., von Hase, A., . . . Possingham, H. P. 499 (2016) . A loss-gain calculator for biodiversity offsets and the circumstances in which no net 500 loss is feasible. Conservation Letters, 9(4), 252-259. doi:10.1111 /conl.12206 501 Griggs, D., Stafford-Smith, M., Gaffney, O., Rockström, J., Öhman, M. C., Shyamsundar, P., . . . Noble, 502 I. (2013 Laitila, J., Moilanen, A., & Pouzols, F. M. (2014) . A method for calculating minimum biodiversity 523 offset multipliers accounting for time discounting, additionality and permanence. Methods 524
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This framework was developed in a working group led by M.M. and J.E.M.W. All authors contributed 587 to the development of the framework. J.S.S. led the writing of the manuscript, and all authors 588 contributed to its preparation, and approved the final version for submission. 589 implies that loss is stopped in absolute terms compared to a fixed reference scenario -i.e. that all 595 biodiversity losses are addressed by gains of the same size, thus maintaining biodiversity at the same 596 level compared to before the loss occurred (a). However, in reality, no net loss commitments 597 frequently only require that individual projects achieve no net loss relative to a declining 598 counterfactual, by protecting biodiversity that might otherwise be lost in the future due to 599 unregulated impacts ('averted loss') (b). Such project-level no net loss results in ongoing loss of 600 biodiversity at the jurisdictional level, albeit at a slower rate (figure adapted from Maron, Brownlie, 601 et al. (2018) ). 602 Figure 2 . Aligning ecological compensation with jurisdictional biodiversity targets starts with 604 establishing the trajectory required to achieve net target outcomes. The required trajectory depends 605 on whether a biodiversity feature is below, at, or above its jurisdictional biodiversity target at the 606 time the target is set ('now'). 607 Improvement and/or Maintenance (denoted by '+') depends on the difference between the level of 614 the biodiversity feature and the target (and in the case of the transitional approach (d)), the 615 threshold (Bi) below which the biodiversity feature cannot decline) (see Supporting Information 1). 616 Importantly, compensation for residual losses from development is one of a suite of complementary 617 measures to achieve the desired trajectory and ultimately achieve a target. At such time that the 618 target is met, maintaining the biodiversity feature at this level requires losses to be compensated for 619 by Improvement at a ratio of 1:1 (or targets could be revised towards ambitious new objectives). 620
Supporting Information 1
Calculating the compensation ratios in target-based ecological compensation
The calculation of an ecological compensation requirement typically factors in a ratio (also called a 'multiplier'). The ratio is a number, usually greater than 1, which tells you how much of a biodiversity feature needs to be replaced/secured per unit of the feature lost. These ratios, in the past, have taken into account issues such as time discounting (biodiversity features produced in the future do not fully compensate for biodiversity features produced now), uncertainty, and risk of failure Laitila, Moilanen, & Pouzols, 2014; ).
Here, we present ratios that accommodate the need to meet target values for various biodiversity features in the landscape -for example, a target for the number of breeding individuals of a species might be a minimum of 10000, a target for the area of suitable habitat for a species might be 5000 home ranges or more, a target for the area of a vegetation community in a region might be at least half of its original extent in good condition, which translates to a minimum area and condition score.
The formulae below assume no time lags (e.g. in the case of Improvement, new features are created instantly). Issues such as time lags will modify the ratios in ways already described Laitila et al., 2014; .
Let ( ) be the state of the biodiversity feature at time where 0 <= ( ) <= 1 for all . This is made up of two parts, the part that is permanently and effectively protected ( ), which are places that are not available for any compensatory related change, and ( ) which is the part that could be destroyed or used for compensation at the end of the mitigation hierarchy. Hence the amount of the biodiversity feature is the sum of the protected and available parts: ( ) + ( ) = ( ) at all times. Further:
Let be the target state of the biodiversity feature and we assume this is time independent (constant).
The ratios we present below assume that (1) all sectors that cause loss of biodiversity will provide compensation; and (2) that each sector's compensation will be a proportionate contribution to the achievement of the target (i.e. everyone compensates equally for the losses they cause). However, in some instances, not all causes of biodiversity loss will fall within the scope of policy that regulates implementation of the mitigation hierarchy. That is, the loss of biodiversity will be a function of regulated and unregulated losses. At the inception of a target-based ecological compensation policy, a government may choose to adjust compensation requirements (with implications for the calculation of compensation ratios) on sectors regulated by the mitigation hierarchy, in one of several ways:
• Compensation from regulated development is disproportionately low. The government would need to address shortfalls arising from disproportionately low compensation.
• Compensation from regulated development is disproportionately high. A disproportionately large share of achieving the target is placed on regulated sectors.
• The achievement of the target is solely the responsibility of regulated sectors, by way of the compensation they provide for the losses they cause.
Where there are unregulated losses that are going uncompensated, the requirement to address these in a way that is consistent with achieving targets accrues to other actors (e.g. the government).
We provide examples of how these policy choices affect compensation ratios, and what this means for the responsibility that falls on both regulated sectors and governments, in an editable spreadsheet in Supplementary Information 2.
Case 1: No Net Loss; the biodiversity feature is at the target ( ( ) = )
If there is no unregulated loss of the biodiversity feature, the compensation ratio (Improvement) is 1. This also applies to all cases once targets are met.
If there is unregulated loss of the biodiversity feature, then either:
• the compensation ratio (Improvement) is 1 and the liability accrues to the authority (e.g. government) to create the biodiversity feature to compensate for unregulated loss; or
• the compensation ratio is adjusted (increased) to enhance the share of the responsibility for achieving the target that falls on regulated sectors.
Case 2: Net Gain; the biodiversity feature is below the target ( ( ) < )
The compensation ratio (Improvement) needs to be set so that, once (hypothetically) all of the (available for development) biodiversity feature at = 0 ( (0)) has been lost, we have met the target. Hence the ratio is ( − (0))/( (0) − (0)) = ( − (0))/ (0), which is the inverse of the fraction of the available biodiversity feature that remains relative to the target. In the special case that none of target is effectively protected (0) = 0 then this is / (0).
For example if the target is = 1000, the effectively protected amount is (0) = 200, and the current total biodiversity feature state is (0) = 600 (so the available amount of the biodiversity feature is (0) = 400) then the compensation ratio (Improvement) is 2 assuming no unregulated losses.
The compensation ratio (Improvement) can be summarised as follows:
Case 3: Managed Net Loss; the biodiversity feature is above the target ( ( ) > )
If there is no unregulated loss of the biodiversity feature and (0) > , no compensation is necessary because we already have met our target in fully protected areas.
If (0) < , then the compensation ratio (Maintenance) is:
For example if the target is = 1000, the effectively protected amount is (0) = 200, and the current total amount of the biodiversity feature is (0) = 1400, then the compensation ratio (Maintenance) is 2.
If the current state of the biodiversity feature (at = 0) is only marginally above the target ( ), then the compensation ratio (Maintenance) will be very large, and may be unfeasibly high to practically implement. For example, should (0) = 10000, and = 9900 (implying a drawdown of 1% of the biodiversity feature to its target), the compensation ratio (Maintenance) will be 99:1 (assuming no unregulated losses, and no current protection). In such circumstances, a mixture of compensation provided using Maintenance only (as described above), and a separate calculation of compensation where Improvement is used according to a different (Managed Net Loss-specific Improvement) ratio calculation of � − (0)� / (0) , may be an option -and if effective Improvement is unfeasible for that biodiversity feature, then avoidance is the only way in which the target can be met.
Provided below is an example of a Managed Net Loss protocol -South Africa's Draft National Biodiversity Offset Policy and provincial guidelines.
Box 1. Example of Managed Net Loss: South Africa Draft National Biodiversity Offset Policy and provincial guidelines
This policy is designed to contribute to achieving specific biodiversity targets for terrestrial ecosystems . The minimum extent of each ecosystem that must be retained intact (relative to its original or historical extent) has been determined based on a scientific process (Desmet & Cowling, 2004) . These ecosystem extent thresholds -in effect, targets -guide compensation requirements. The amount of compensation for residual losses from development depends on how much of the impacted ecosystem remains, relative to its historical extent and target, and how much of it is formally protected.
Where an ecosystem is below its retention threshold or target, development may not occur, other than under exceptional circumstances. For above-target ecosystems, compensation is done by protecting another place where the impacted ecosystem occurs using a Maintenance ratio scaled based on the difference between the current and desired minimum extent of the ecosystem and how much of it is protected. The net outcome in absolute terms is a Managed Net Loss -because the protected biodiversity existed at the time of the loss from the development. This target-based system carefully manages losses to avoid ecosystem extent falling below scientifically-robust thresholds. This policy avoids the 'no net loss' wording -because it is not designed to achieve no net loss.
Case 4: No Net Loss or Net Gain (transition)
A potential limitation of target-based ecological compensation is that desired No Net Loss or Net Gain outcomes (e.g. Figure 3a and Figure 3b in main review article) may not be immediately feasible in a situation of steep, continued, unaddressed and unregulated biodiversity loss. Indeed, a focus solely on Improvement actions like restoration before large-scale biodiversity loss has ceased could even be counterproductive. In such cases, a phased transition designed to ultimately achieve No Net Loss or Net Gain outcomes, that is embedded in the principles of this target-based framework, may be the most appropriate approach (Figure 3d in main review article) .
The phased transition would temporarily accept a strictly controlled interim phase in which Maintenance (plus some Improvement, where feasible) interventions first aim to slow the decline of the biodiversity feature that is the focus of the compensation by securing sites where it currently exists (i.e. resembling a Managed Net Loss). Maintenance ratios in this phase would be designed not to achieve the ultimate desired target for that biodiversity feature, but to avoid breaching a predefined threshold limit to loss (Figure 3d in main review article). The threshold would need to be set such that enough of the focal biodiversity (extent of ecosystem; population of species) remained to allow for recovery to be feasible. Well before the threshold is reached, the approach transitions to require an Improvement ratio such that the desired No Net Loss or Net Gain outcome can be approached over time as the trajectory of the focal biodiversity feature reverses. As for all jurisdictional No Net Loss and Net Gain outcomes, this is possible only for biodiversity features that can be 'improved', such as through restoration or interventions that drive population increase. Further, the lower the initial threshold, the larger the subsequent Improvement ratio must be to achieve the target.
The phased transition to target-based compensation carries risks, but where a jurisdiction aims to, and can feasibly (in time) achieve a No Net Loss or Net Gain outcome for a particular biodiversity feature, and that same feature is in steep and ongoing decline, the short-term alternatives are few. They include: (1) immediate prevention of all actions causing biodiversity decline;
(2) acceptance of less-ambitious biodiversity targets that allow for further drawdown of biodiversity, with compensatory policy designed to achieve an outcome of Managed Net Loss (i.e. capping ongoing losses at a pre-defined level); (3) use of counterfactual-based offsetting alongside unmanaged ongoing net losses; or (4) no compensation for losses at all -in other words unmanaged loss without limit -which poses serious risks for nature and people.
Calculating compensation requirements where the ultimate outcome of No Net Loss or Net Gain is achieved using a transitional approach involves a combination of Cases 2 and 3, as described above. Compensation using Maintenance (Case 3) is used first, to secure existing elements of the biodiversity feature, in the face of ongoing and severe threats. The approach switches to compensation through Improvement (Case 2), well before the biodiversity feature reaches a predetermined threshold below which it is not permitted to decline. Thus, there is the intermediate threshold below which the biodiversity feature cannot decline ( ) and the ultimate (No Net Loss or Net Gain) target ( ).
Critically, determining the intermediate threshold ( ) should be based primarily on ecological considerations: the threshold would need to be set such that enough of the focal biodiversity (e.g. extent of ecosystem; population of species) remained to allow for recovery to be feasible. However, establishing a compensation ratio (Maintenance) that can be practically implemented is another consideration here. This calculation provides a means by which to select the intermediate threshold ( ) value that accounts for what can be practically implemented regarding maximum compensation ratios (Maintenance). Importantly, the lower the compensation ratio (and thus, intermediate threshold ( ) value), the greater amount of compensation (and thus the higher the compensation ratio) will be when the approach switches to Improvement. Again, the primary consideration must always be the ecological attributes of the specific biodiversity feature, and the landscape context in which that feature occurs. In other words, the intermediate threshold ( ), and the compensation ratio must never be so low as to render recovery of the biodiversity feature, and enhancement through Improvement to achieve the ultimate No Net Loss or Net Gain target ( ), unfeasible.
Supporting Information 3
Conservation planning and sustainable development considerations in target-based ecological compensation
Trading up to higher conservation imperatives
Target-based ecological compensation is well-aligned with other key conservation imperatives and broader sustainable development considerations. For example, in this target-based framework, 'trading up' may be an option in certain circumstances. Trading up, or 'out-of-kind' trading refers to the practice of compensating for the loss of one particular biodiversity feature (at the development site) by benefiting another type of (generally greater conservation value) biodiversity feature elsewhere (Bull, Milner-Gulland, Suttle, & Singh, 2014; Quétier & Lavorel, 2011) . Compensation for residual losses affecting biodiversity features that are above their target might be directed to other biodiversity features that are below their target. For example, Improvement actions to increase the amount and/or quality of the focal (below-target) biodiversity feature might be preferred over Maintenance actions focussed on the above-target feature. However, this would mean that the development-related losses of the impacted (above-target) biodiversity feature are not compensated, and so this type of 'trading up' would only be appropriate where these losses are carefully managed and strictly limited (e.g. by other regulatory instruments) to ensure that the 'above target' biodiversity feature does not decline below its target.
Landscape level planning
There is a need to move beyond what can be achieved by site-level planning for individual projects to consider development scenarios at a larger scale and assess the integrated opportunities for achieving better economic, social, and environmental outcomes (Kiesecker & Naugle, 2017) . Landscape conservation plans designed to guide application of the mitigation hierarchy (Fitzsimons, Heiner, McKenney, Sochi, & Kiesecker, 2014; Kiesecker, Copeland, Pocewicz, & McKenney, 2010) and optimal habitat protection and restoration strategies (Possingham, Bode, & Klein, 2015) are needed to maintain critical levels of habitat amount and configurations and ensure viable conservation outcomes. The establishment of outcome-based biodiversity targets, and linking ecological compensation to the achievement of these targets, lends itself well to supporting broader, strategic development planning of this nature. Further, embedding mitigation decisions into strategic plans that also consider a range of future development scenarios (Evans & Kiesecker, 2014) , can benefit governments, businesses and communities by supporting more informed development decisions. Planning at this larger scale also informs strategies for long-term landscape resilience, such as ensuring functional watersheds for clean drinking water (Evans & Kiesecker, 2014 ) and connected habitat for species (Monteith, Hayes, Kauffman, Copeland, & Sawyer, 2018 ) -strategic use of targetbased ecological compensation, with its explicit and transparent approach to determining compensatory requirements, has the potential to make important contributions to such endeavours.
